Employment Law by Jones, Earl M., III et al.
SMU Law Review
Volume 57
Issue 3 Annual Survey of Texas Law Article 16
2004
Employment Law
Earl M. Jones III
Jason R. Dugas
Jennifer A. Youpa
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in SMU Law Review by
an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Earl M. Jones III, et al., Employment Law, 57 SMU L. Rev. 881 (2004)
https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr/vol57/iss3/16
EMPLOYMENT LAW
Earl M. Jones, III*
Jason R. Dugas**
Jennifer A. Youpa***
NYTIME the United States Supreme Court upholds a Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals's opinion with a unanimous decision in
a case interpreting Title VII, practitioners should take note. The
Court's decision in Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa is relatively short, but its
impact will have long-lasting implications. In the few months since the
decision, many writings have attempted to foretell how courts will apply
the decision. The good news for Texas practitioners is that Desert Palace
is to federal law what Quantum Chemical Corp v. Toennies is to Texas
law. This year's Survey will analyze Desert Palace and Quantum Chemi-
cal to demonstrate how practitioners on either side of the docket may use
it to a client's advantage. Although Desert Palace was the most signifi-
cant opinion issued affecting labor and employment practitioners during
the Survey period, this article discusses other noteworthy cases. This cat-
egory includes discussion of Mission Petroleum Carriers, Inc. v. Solomon
and Canchola v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., two cases in which the Texas Su-
preme Court rejected Plaintiffs' attempts to weaken the employment-at-
will doctrine.
I. STATUTORY CLAIMS
A. STATE & FEDERAL ANTI-DISCRIMINATION STATUTES
1. Generally
a. Desert Palace-Case Background
In order to understand the issue confronting the Supreme Court in De-
sert Palace v. Costa,1 and hence its potential impact, it is instructive to
examine the two proof structures applicable to disparate treatment cases
* Earl M. Jones, III is Vice President, Legal, Dean Foods Company, specializing in
labor and employment law matters. Mr. Jones received his J.D. with honors from Southern
Methodist University School of Law in 1994. While at SMU, Mr. Jones served as a leading
articles editor for the SMU Law Review Association.
** Jason R. Dugas, an Associate in the Dallas office of Littler Mendelson, P.C.,
earned his J.D. from the University of Virginia School of Law in 2001. Mr. Dugas would
like to thank Kimberly Miers, a 2003 graduate of Southern Methodist University School of
Law, for her invaluable assistance in the drafting of this survey.
*** Jennifer A. Youpa, Senior Counsel at the Dallas office of Littler Mendelson, P.C.,
earned her J.D. from the University of Texas Law School in 1985, where she served on the
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1. Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 123 S. Ct. 2148 (2003).
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existing prior to Desert Palace.2 Under the McDonnell Douglas "min-
uet," 3 a plaintiff must establish his or her prima facie case (or at least
create fact questions on each element). Then the employer-defendant
has the burden to come forward with its legitimate nondiscriminatory
reason for the employment action.4 McDonnell Douglas then requires
that the plaintiff challenge the defendant's proffered reason-that is, the
plaintiff must show that the proffered reason is a pretext for
discrimination. 5
On the other hand, a "mixed motive" case is one where legitimate and
illegitimate reasons for the employment action exist because the plaintiff
first proved that discrimination was a "motivating factor."'6 Although
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins held that an employer is not liable if it
proves that it would have made the same decision in the absence of the
impermissible factor,7 the Court was split as to when the burden of proof
should shift to the employer to prove the affirmative defense. 8 In Justice
O'Connor's concurring opinion, she concluded that only when a plaintiff
offers direct evidence that an impermissible criterion, such as gender or
race, was a substantial motivating factor does the burden shift to the em-
ployer. Otherwise, the plaintiff must prove intentional discrimination vis-
A-vis the McDonnell Douglas framework. 9
In the 1991 Amendments to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1991,
Congress provided that an unlawful employment action is established
when a plaintiff "demonstrates" that an impermissible criterion was "a
motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors
also motivated the practice."' 10 Congress provided employers with a lim-
ited affirmative defense that does not absolve it of liability but restricts
the plaintiff's remedies to declaratory relief, certain types of injunctive
2. See Waltman v. Int'l Paper Co., 875 F.2d 468, 481 (5th Cir. 1989) ("[T]he elements
of proof in a sex discrimination claim will vary depending on whether the evidence leads to
a discrimination claim based on 'mixed motives' or 'pretext."'); Mooney v. Aramco Servs.
Co., 54 F.3d 1207, 1217 (5th Cir. 1995) (stating that "Price Waterhouse and McDonnell
Douglas are alternative methodologies for proving discrimination."). This discussion omits
the "pattern and practice" framework used for class-based challenges to intentional dis-
crimination, usually relying on statistical evidence. See Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United
States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977). In addition, the proof structure for disparate impact cases is
set forth in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), reinterpreted in Wards Cove
Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989), and codified in a modified form in the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k).
3. See, e.g., Davis v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 14 F.3d 1082, 1085 nn.7-8 (5th Cir. 1994)
(per curiam); Holley v. Sanyo Mfg., Inc., 771 F.2d 1161, 1164 (8th Cir. 1985); see also
Deborach C. Malamud, The Last Minuet: Disparate Treatment After Hicks, 93 MICH. L.
REV. 2229 (1995).
4. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
5. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2000).
7. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 252-53 (1989).
8. Id. at 261-62 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
9. Id.
10. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(m).
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relief, and attorney's fees and costs." In order to utilize the limited af-
firmative defense, the employer must demonstrate "that [it] would have
taken the same action in the absence of the impermissible motivating
factor."'12
Desert Palace provided the Supreme Court its first opportunity to con-
sider the effects of the 1991 Amendments on jury instructions in mixed-
motive cases. The case involved the sole female warehouse employee
and heavy equipment operator at Ceasar's Palace in Las Vegas. 13 Due to
conflicts with management and co-workers, she received escalating disci-
plinary sanctions. 14 Her employer fired her after a physical altercation in
a warehouse elevator with a fellow union member who had a clean disci-
plinary record. Although she was terminated, her co-worker only re-
ceived a five-day suspension. Costa filed gender discrimination and
sexual harassment claims in federal court.
The court dismissed her harassment claim but allowed her discrimina-
tion case to proceed. At trial, Costa offered the following evidence: she
was singled out for "intense stalking" by a supervisor; she received har-
sher discipline than men for the same conduct; she was treated less favor-
ably than men in the assignment of overtime; her supervisor "stacked her
disciplinary record;" and her supervisor frequently used or tolerated sex-
based slurs against her. The trial court denied the employer's motion for
judgment as a matter of law. In sending the case to the jury, the court
gave the following "mixed-motive" instruction:
You have heard evidence that the defendant's treatment of the plain-
tiff was motivated by the plaintiff's sex and also by other lawful rea-
sons. If you find that the plaintiff's sex was a motivating factor in the
defendant's treatment of the plaintiff, the plaintiff is entitled to your
verdict, even if you find that the defendant's conduct was also moti-
vated by a lawful reason. However, if you find that the defendant's
treatment of the plaintiff was motivated by both gender and lawful
reasons, you must decide whether the plaintiff is entitled to damages.
The plaintiff is entitled to damages unless the defendant proves by a
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant would have
treated plaintiff similarly even if the plaintiff's gender had played no
role in the employment decision. 15
11. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B); see Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 246. ("[T]he em-
ployer's burden is most appropriately deemed an affirmative defense: the plaintiff must
persuade the factfinder on one point, and then the employer, if it wishes to prevail, must
persuade it on another."); but cf. Donovan v. Milk Mktg., Inc., 243 F. 3d 584, 586-87 (2d
Cir. 2001) (suggesting that the doctrine is not an "affirmative defense" per se but merely an
analytical framework; all that an employer needs to do to trigger mixed-motive analysis is
suggest that an alternate, nondiscriminatory justification motivated its action. Such a state-
ment "implicitly includes a statement, 'Even if you should find that discrimination played
some role (which I deny), you should nonetheless find I would have taken the same action
because of plaintiff's incompetence."').
12. Desert Palace, 123 S. Ct. at 2151.





The jury returned a verdict for the employee and awarded backpay and
compensatory and punitive damages, and the trial court denied the em-
ployer's motion for judgment as a matter of law.16 Although a Ninth Cir-
cuit panel vacated and remanded the trial court's decision, 17 an en banc
panel held that the 1991 amendments to Title VII did not require the
increased burden of direct evidence. 18 Thus, because Costa's evidence
was sufficient to warrant a mixed-motive instruction and a reasonable
jury could have found that her gender was a "motivating factor in her
treatment," the en banc panel reinstated the trial court's judgment.
The Supreme Court affirmed the en banc panel and unanimously held
that direct evidence of discrimination is not required for a plaintiff to
obtain a mixed-motive jury instruction under Title VII.' 9 The Court rea-
soned that Title VII, as amended, unambiguously provides "that a plain-
tiff need only 'demonstrate' that an employer used a forbidden
consideration with respect to any employment practice and does not
mention the requirement of a heightened showing through direct evi-
dence."' 20 "Demonstrate," the Court observed, is defined in the statute as
"meet[ing] the burdens of production and persuasion. '21 The Court fur-
ther reasoned that, had Congress intended a direct evidence requirement,
it knew how to do so, as it has elsewhere, citing 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B)
and 42 U.S.C. § 5851(b)(3)(D) as examples. Additionally, the Court did
not want to depart from the "conventional rule of civil litigation [that]
generally applies in Title VII cases" requiring a plaintiff to prove his or
her case by a preponderance of the evidence using direct or circumstan-
tial evidence. 22
b. Two Interpretations of Desert Palace
In the wake of Desert Palace, practitioners have debated its impact and
the degree to which the opinion alters the existing legal landscape. Be-
cause a thorough examination of Desert Palace's impact on proof struc-
tures applicable to employment discrimination cases is more
appropriately addressed by a separate article, the following provides a
sketch of the two nascent views.
i. After Desert Palace, Summary Judgment Becomes Harder For
Defendants
Although the Court declined to determine whether the standards appli-
cable in "mixed-motive" cases codified in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) apply
"outside of the mixed-motive context, '23 a few district courts have al-
16. Id. at 2153.
17. Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 268 F.3d 882, 885 (9th Cir. 2001).
18. Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 299 F.3d 838, 853 (9th Cir. 2002).
19. Desert Palace, 123 S. Ct. at 2155.
20. Id. at 2153.
21. Id. at 2154 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(m)).
22. Id.
23. Id. at 2151 n.1.
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ready questioned the continued vitality of the burden-shifting framework
of McDonnell Douglas in light of Desert Palace.24 Such an outcome, how-
ever, may fall under the category of "unintended consequences" because
the Desert Palace opinion makes no mention of McDonnell Douglas,
much less any intention to dismantle the long-standing paradigm.
An examination of the difference between the two paradigms illumi-
nates the debate. Cases falling within the McDonnell Douglas "pretext"
analytical framework have been characterized as "single-motive" cases
because the employer's employment decision was either legitimate and
legal, or it was false and the employer intentionally discriminated against
the plaintiff-the factfinder is left to figure out which one motivated the
employment action. 25 Thus, plaintiffs having to rely on the McDonnell
Douglas framework typically have a more difficult, or higher, evidentiary
threshold to establish employer liability because they must demonstrate
"but for" causation for the employment decision.2 6 In contrast, a plaintiff
in a case falling within a "mixed-motive"/Price Waterhouse analysis only
had to show that the impermissible factor was a "motivating" one-in
other words, that the impermissible reason contributed to the decision in
some way.
2 7
Prior to Desert Palace, the direct evidence requirement acted as the
"gatekeeper," regulating which cases (and hence, plaintiffs) qualified to
take advantage of the lower evidentiary threshold that applied in mixed-
motive cases. 28 However, by removing the direct evidence limitation in
Desert Palace, the Supreme Court impliedly rendered the McDonnell
Douglas framework meaningless because the motivating factor standard
applies to cases predicated on circumstantial evidence, as well as those
based on direct evidence. In the context of sufficiency of the evidence
24. See Dare v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 267 F. Supp. 2d 987, 991 (D. Minn. 2003) (find-
ing that, following Supreme Court's decision in Desert Palace, courts are no longer obli-
gated to apply the McDonnell Douglas framework when considering a motion for
summary judgment on a "single motive" Title VII claim.); Griffith v. City of Des Moines,
No. 4:01-CV-10537, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14365 (S.D. Iowa Aug. 6, 2003) (concluding
that plaintiffs may bring Title VII claims "without being confined to the strictures of the
McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.").
25. See Dare, 267 F. Supp. 2d at 991.
26. Fabela v. Socorro Indep. Sch. Dist., 329 F.3d 409 (5th Cir. 2003) (describing the
McDonnell Douglas framework as "the less advantageous circumstantial evidentiary path"
(citing Portis v. First Nat'l Bank, 34 F.3d 325, 328 (5th Cir. 1994)).
27. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 252-53.
28. Id. at 247 n.12:
Nothing in this opinion should be taken to suggest that a case must be cor-
rectly labeled as either a "pretext" case or a "mixed-motives" case from the
beginning in the District Court; indeed, we expect that plaintiffs often will
allege, in the alternative, that their cases are both. Discovery often will be
necessary before the plaintiff can know whether both legitimate and illegiti-
mate considerations played a part in the decisions against her. At some point
in the proceedings, of course, the District Court must decide whether a par-
ticular case involves mixed motives. If the plaintiff fails to satisfy the fact
finder that it is more likely than not that a forbidden characteristic played a
part in the employment decision, then she may prevail only if she proves,




motions, such as summary judgment or judgment as a matter of law, the
implications of Desert Palace seem to make the issue of whether the
plaintiff has offered sufficient evidence of "pretext" irrelevant. If the
plaintiff's evidence, either circumstantial or direct, is sufficient to meet
the "motivating factor" standard, the plaintiff avoids summary judgment.
In Dare v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., a federal district court in Minnesota
found that the 1991 Amendments applied to a single-motive case because
nothing in the statute limits 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) to mixed-motive
cases. 29 The court reasoned that because the statute "unambiguously
prohibits any degree of consideration of a plaintiff's race, gender, or
other enumerated classification in making an employment decision, it
must also extend to single-motive claims."' 30 The court also noted that
evaluating "claims under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting scheme
inevitably and paradoxically leads to a classic mixed-motive scenario"
and that the Desert Palace decision "exposed" this legal fiction.31 Like-
wise, in Griffith v. City of Des Moines, a federal district court in Iowa
observed that Desert Palace "changed the burden shifting landscape at
the summary judgment stage of employment discrimination lawsuits."'32
The court further stated that Title VII plaintiffs are no longer bound by
the strictures of the McDonnell Douglas framework. Rather, "plaintiffs
must simply demonstrate that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to
whether or not race was a motivating factor in an adverse employment
action."33
ii. The Supreme- Court-Would-Not-Hurt-Employers Argument
Desert Palace jeopardizes every plaintiffs chance of
economic damages at trial
Desert Palace does not alter summary judgment practice in disparate
treatment cases unless a court has been applying a causation standard
other than "motivating factor." In the Fifth Circuit for many years, 34 and
in Texas state courts since Quantum Chemical,35 the appropriate standard
has been whether a plaintiff has sufficient evidence to establish whether a
protected trait motivated the employment decision. Therefore, Desert
Palace, which its procedural history demonstrates, must be considered
only as a jury instruction case.36
29. Dare, 267 F. Supp. 2d at 990-91.
30. Id. at 991.
31. Id.
32. Griffith v. City of Des Moines, No. 4:01-CV-10537, 2003 WL 21976083, at *1 (S.D.
Iowa, Aug. 6, 2003).
33. Id.
34. Mayberry v. Vought Aircraft Co., 55 F.3d 1086, 1089 (5th Cir. 1995).
35. Quantum Chem. Corp. v. Toennies, 47 S.W.3d 473, 480 (Tex. 2000).
36. See Gover v. Speedway Super Am., LLC, 284 F. Supp. 2d 858, 865 n.1 (S.D. Ohio
2003) (explaining that because the plaintiff did not assert the case as a mixed-motive case,
and the litigation was not at the "jury instruction stage," the court rejected Plaintiff's argu-
ment that Desert Palace counsels against granting defense motion for summary judgment).
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Just like the Texas Supreme Court in Quantum Chemical, the United
States Supreme Court first looked to the plain wording of the statute at
issue. In Quantum Chemical, the court read the Texas Labor Code and
ignored those arguing that the court should follow the tortured mixed-
motive analysis then existing in federal law. In fact, Justice Phillips, the
author of the Quantum Chemical opinion, foretold the analysis used by
Justice Thomas in Desert Palace:
The statute's plain language does not indicate that Congress in-
tended [S]ection 107 to apply only in mixed-motive cases. Rather,
[S]ection 107(a) simply says that "an unlawful employment practice
is established when the complaining party demonstrates that race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any
employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the
practice." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m). Establishing an unlawful em-
ployment practice is, of course, the entire point of a plaintiff's suit,
no matter how it is judicially classified. 37
After demonstrating that federal judicial opinions were inconsistent
with the federal statute, Justice Phillips began to analyze the Texas Labor
Code. He wrote, "The plain meaning of this statute establishes 'a moti-
vating factor' as the plaintiff's standard of causation in a TCHRA unlaw-
ful employment practice claim, regardless of how many factors influenced
the employment decision."'38
The clear holding of Quantum Chemical requires a plaintiff to demon-
strate that a protected trait "motivated" the employer's practice or act.
All a plaintiff must do is request an instruction to the jury consistent with
Texas Labor Code Section 21.125(a), and "[i]t is the defendant's burden
to plead and request instructions on an affirmative defense" under Sec-
tion 21.125(b). 39 Although Quantum Chemical places the burden of
proof on the defendant, it permits the employer in every discrimination
case under the Texas Labor Code to request the jury to answer a question
which could eliminate substantially all of the plaintiff's compensatory and
punitive damages. Desert Palace does the same for defendants under fed-
eral law. Just like the Texas Labor Code, Title VII does not have sepa-
rate causes of action for discrimination. Though it has been confused
over time, "mixed-motive" is an employer defense, not a plaintiff's
sword.40 The plain language of the statute says it is the defendant's re-
sponsibility to demonstrate that the defendant "would have taken the
same action in the absence of the impermissible motivating factor. '41
37. Quantum Chem., 47 S.W.3d at 478.
38. Id. at 480.
39. Id. at 481.
40. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 246 ("the employer's burden is most appropri-
ately deemed an affirmative defense: the plaintiff must persuade the factfinder on one
point, and then the employer, if it wishes to prevail, must persuade it on another."); see
also Garcia v. City of Houston, 201 F.3d 672, 675-76 (5th Cir. 2000).
41. TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 21.125(b) (Vernon 1996).
2004]
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For Texas practitioners, the state and federal practice should be the
same again. Assuming a case survives summary judgment, the plaintiff
will ask for the following question: "Was the plaintiff terminated because
of her age?" and an instruction explaining that "because" means that age
was a motivating factor in the decision. The defendant then should re-
quest this jury question: "If you find that the Plaintiff was terminated
because of her age, do you find that the defendant would have taken the
same action in the absence of the impermissible motivating factor?" If
the jury answers "yes" to both questions, the plaintiff's hope for eco-
nomic windfall goes down the drain.
c. Other Notable Anti-Discrimination Cases-General
The Supreme Court's decision in Desert Palace is by far the most signif-
icant employment law case decided during the Survey period. Other
cases during the Survey period, however, have sharpened interesting con-
tours of the law applicable to discrimination cases generally. For exam-
ple, in Clackamas Gastroenterology Associates, P.C. v. Wells, the Court
had to decide what test to use to determine who constitutes an "em-
ployee."'42 Although the Court was faced with a claim arising under the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the holding is not confined to
the particulars of the ADA. Determining who constituted an "employee"
was meaningful in Clackamas because plaintiff's employer was a small
medical clinic. The plaintiff could satisfy the fifteen-employee threshold
of the ADA if the four physician-shareholders also constituted
employees. 43
The trial court relied on an "economic realities" test and concluded
that the four doctors were more analogous to partners than to sharehold-
ers.44 Thus, the doctors were not employees. The Ninth Circuit dis-
agreed, holding that "[iut saw 'no reason to permit a professional
corporation to secure the 'best of both possible worlds' by allowing it
both to assert its corporate status in order to reap the tax and civil liabil-
ity advantages and to argue that it is like a partnership in order to avoid
liability for unlawful employment discrimination.' 45
At the outset, the Supreme Court acknowledged that the ADA's defi-
nition of employee was of little utility and completely circular-defining
employee as "an individual employed by an employer. '46 As it had done
in the ERISA context, the Court concluded that "when Congress has
used the term 'employee' without defining it, ... Congress intended to
describe the conventional master-servant relationship as understood by
common-law agency doctrine."' 47




46. Id. at 1677.
47. Id. at 1678.
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The Court also endorsed the six factors outlined in the EEOC's Com-
pliance Manual § 605:0008 to be considered in answering the question of
control. As framed by the EEOC, the question to ask is "whether the
individual acts independently and participates in managing the organiza-
tion, or whether the individual is subject to the organization's control. '48
These six factors are (1) whether the organization can hire or fire the
individual or set the rules and regulations of the individual's work; (2)
whether and, if so, to what extent the organization supervises the individ-
ual's work; (3) whether the individual reports to someone higher in the
organization; (4) whether and, if so, to what extent the individual is able
to influence the organization; (5) whether the parties intended that the
individual be an employee, as expressed in written agreements or con-
tracts; and (6) whether the individual shares in the profits, losses, and
liabilities of the organization. 49 The Court cautioned that the mere exis-
tence of a document styled "employment agreement" does not lead inex-
orably to the conclusion that either party is an employee. Instead the
answer depends on all the incidents of the relationship with no one factor
being decisive.50
The body of law surrounding whether a plaintiff seeking redress under
the panoply of anti-discrimination law has "exhausted the remedies"
under the applicable law expanded again during the Survey period with
the case of Smith v. University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center of
Dallas.5' In that case, the plaintiff claimed that she contracted histoplas-
mosis, a disease "contracted through inhaling spores from an organism
that thrives in areas enriched by bird droppings," while performing her
duties of maintaining the University's bird sanctuary.5 2 In her lawsuit,
she alleged that the disease left her disabled.
On June 23, 1997, she filed charges of discrimination with the EEOC,
and she subsequently received a right-to-sue letter on October 28, 1997.
Plaintiff filed suit in federal court on January 29, 1998, but her claims
under the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act and other Texas stat-
utes and tort laws were dismissed without prejudice on January 15,
1999.53 Plaintiff proceeded to file suit in Texas state court. The Univer-
sity, however, filed a plea to the jurisdiction, arguing, inter alia, that Smith
failed to exhaust her administrative remedies under the Texas Labor
Code. 54
Smith responded by pointing to the fact that she properly reported the
claim to the Texas Commission on Human Rights ("Commission") when
she filed a charge with the EEOC. She also referred to the Worksharing
Agreement between the EEOC and the Commission. According to
48. Id. at 1680.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1680-81.
51. Smith v. Univ. of Tex. S.W. Med. Ctr. of Dallas, 101 S.W.3d 185 (5th Cir. 2003).





Smith, reporting to the EEOC was the equivalent of reporting to the
Commission. The court rejected Smith's claims, stating that "[e]ven if
[Smith's] notion of automatic dual reporting were supported by the facts
and the law-and we seriously question whether it is-merely reporting a
claim to the EEOC is not equivalent to exhausting administrative reme-
dies with the Commission. ' 55 There was "no evidence that the Commis-
sion ever received, investigated, or resolved her complaint in any
fashion," which was not surprising given the fact that her EEOC charge
contained only federal claims and she did not check the box directing the
EEOC to forward the complaint to the Commission. 56
In Burrell v. Crown Central Petroleum, six employees claimed that their
"supervisors often used racial epithets when referring to African-Ameri-
can employees and that supervisors 'routinely create, distribute, and post
handbills in the workplace' that [were] offensive and demeaning to Afri-
can-American and female employees. '57 The case is noteworthy because
the court undertakes a thorough analysis of the continuing violation doc-
trine. It bases the analysis, in part, on Fifth Circuit precedent providing
that a knowing plaintiff cannot take advantage of the continuing violation
doctrine, but the court makes no mention of the Supreme Court's 2002
case of National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan.58
As discussed in last year's Survey, in the Morgan case, the U.S. Su-
preme Court clarified the time frames for filing charges of discrimination
with the EEOC, going directly to the statute to define its test. The court
held that hostile environment claims are different in kind from those aris-
ing out of "discrete" acts of discrimination.5 9 Thus, because "a hostile
work environment claim is comprised of a series of separate acts that
collectively constitute one 'unlawful employment practice,' the entire
time period of the hostile environment may be considered by a court for
the purposes of determining liability."'60 A court's task, the Court in-
structed, "is to determine whether the acts about which an employee
complains are part of the same actionable hostile work environment prac-
tice, and if so, whether any act falls within the statutory time period."'61
In Morgan's case, he presented evidence that managers made racial
jokes, performed racially derogatory acts, and used various racial epi-
thets. Although many of these acts occurred outside the 300-day filing
period, the Court held that they could be a part of the same actionable
hostile environment claim.62 Notably, the Court rejected the employer's
argument that recovery for untimely conduct "should be available only in
hostile environment cases where the plaintiff reasonably did not know
55. Id. at 188.
56. Id. at 188-89.
57. Burrell v. Crown Cent. Petroleum, Inc., 255 F. Supp. 2d 591, 597 (E.D. Tex. 2003).
58. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 (2002).
59. Id. at 115.
60. Id. at 117.
61. Id. at 120.
62. Id. at 120-21.
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such conduct was discriminatory or where the discriminatory nature of
such conduct is recognized as discriminatory only in light of later
events. "
63
In the case of Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Canchola, the Texas Supreme
Court had another occasion to insulate the employer from claims arising
out of an allegedly carelessly performed investigation. 64 During the 2002
term, the supreme court ruled that Texas does not recognize a claim of
"negligent investigation. '65 In Canchola, the plaintiff, a Wal-Mart deli
manager, asserted claims of disability discrimination and intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress and utilized evidence casting doubt on the
trustworthiness of the investigation as evidence of pretext.66
Plaintiff was terminated shortly after taking time off for sextuple by-
pass surgery. Despite admitting that the company supported him and did
not diminish his pay, Canchola said that his supervisor, David Drastrata,
displayed a hostile attitude towards him, expressed dissatisfaction with
his absence at manager meetings, and asked him to rearrange his sched-
ule so he could attend the meeting. Canchola had heard from another
employee that "someone was out to get him."'67
One of Canchola's subordinates, Irene Flores, came to Drastrata's of-
fice accompanied by another co-worker, Carmen Gonzalez. With an-
other manager present, Flores reported that she had seen Canchola
approach Gonzalez from behind, lean over her, and say something in her
ear. When Flores confronted Gonzalez about the incident at a later time,
Gonzalez started crying. Gonzalez then told Drastrata that she had been
trying to obtain a full-time deli position and Canchola told her she could
get it if she "gave a piece of herself to him." Gonzalez also explained that
"Canchola frequently asked her out, waited for her after work to offer
her a ride home, and told her that eventually she would be his."' 68
When Drastrata asked her if anyone else knew of Canchola's behavior,
Gonzalez indicated that two co-workers, Gracie and Katherine Solis,
knew. In his interviews with Gracie Solis, she reported that Canchola
would hug and kiss her on the sales floor in front of customers, and that
he would repeatedly profess his love for her. She also said that when she
told him to stop, Canchola started asking her sister Katherine out for
dates. When Drastrata questioned Katherine Solis, she reported similar
behavior.69
Wal-Mart subsequently terminated Canchola for sexual harassment,
but Canchola filed suit for disability discrimination and intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress. The jury returned a verdict in favor of
63. Id. at 117 n.11.
64. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Canchola, 121 S.W.3d 735 (Tex. 2003).
65. Tex. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Cos. v. Sears, 84 S.W.3d 604, 609 (Tex. 2002).
66. Canchola, 121 S.W.3d at 738-40.
67. Id. at 737.




Canchola, which was upheld on appeal. 70 In its appeal to the Texas Su-
preme Court, Wal-Mart contested the sufficiency of the evidence. Be-
cause a trial had taken place, the court did not engage in a burden-
shifting analysis. Rather, the court assessed whether there was sufficient
evidence that disability discrimination was a "motivating factor" in Wal-
Mart's decision to terminate Canchola. The court held there was not suf-
ficient evidence. 71
The court predicated its holding on the fact that the evidence cited by
Canchola assailed the quality of the investigation and did not, by itself,
prove that his heart condition was a motivating factor in his termina-
tion.72 Thus, it was insufficient for Canchola to present evidence that the
sexual harassment investigation was "imperfect, incomplete, or arrived at
a possibly incorrect conclusion. ' 73 Instead, the plaintiff "must show that
the reason proffered by Wal-Mart is 'false, and that discrimination was
the real reason." 74 Therefore, because Canchola cited no evidence that
the decision was motivated by his disability, there was insufficient evi-
dence to support the jury's verdict.75
Notably, the court rejected Canchola's Reeves argument-that the fal-
sity of the Wal-Mart's reasons combined with the elements of his prima
facie case would suffice to prove intentional discrimination. 76 The court
reasoned that, even if the reasons given by Wal-Mart were false,
Canchola still bore the ultimate burden to prove that Wal-Mart discrimi-
nated against him because of his disability.77 Stated another way, "[t]he
relevant inquiry is not whether the complaints made against [him] were a
pretext, but what they were a pretext for. '78 Because there was no evi-
dence that Wal-Mart was motivated to terminate him because of his heart
condition, plaintiff's discrimination claim failed.79
2. Anti-Discrimination Cases-Specific Categories
a. Retaliation
The Fifth Circuit addressed the issue of whether an employer's act of
filing a counterclaim constitutes an "ultimate employment action" for
purposes of proving retaliation in the case of Hernandez v. Crawford
Building Material Co.80 The plaintiff in Hernandez was an employee re-
sponsible for cutting carpet in defendant's warehouse. Over time, the de-
fendant became increasingly unhappy with plaintiff's work and ultimately
70. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Canchola, 121 S.W.3d 735 (Tex. 2003).
71. Id. at 740.
72. Id.
73. Id.






80. Hernandez v. Crawford Bldg. Material Co., 321 F.3d 528, 531 (5th Cir. 2003).
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fired him after he miscut a roll of carpet and failed to report the mistake.
The plaintiff timely filed a charge and subsequent lawsuit alleging dis-
crimination in violation of the ADEA.81
At some point while plaintiff was pursuing his lawsuit, someone told
one of the defendant's owners that plaintiff had been stealing company
property during his employment. The witness was a painter who had done
business with defendant. He reported seeing building materials belonging
to defendant stacked behind plaintiff's house; he also reported that plain-
tiff was selling that property. Plaintiff allegedly told the witness that de-
fendant paid him with building materials. 82 In its answer to plaintiff's
ADEA complaint, the defendant denied the allegations of discriminatory
discharge and raised a counterclaim for theft against plaintiff.83 In his
answer to defendant's counterclaim, plaintiff denied having ever stolen
building materials, and he subsequently supplemented his original com-
plaint to allege that defendant's counterclaim amounted to a retaliatory
employment action in violation of Title VII, the ADEA, and § 1981. 84
Because defendant "could not prove specifically, or even generally,
what was stolen or that plaintiff stole it," the trial court granted plaintiff's
motion for summary judgment on defendant's counterclaim. 85 Addition-
ally, the jury rejected plaintiff's claim of discrimination but found that
defendant's filing of the counterclaim constituted a retaliatory employ-
ment action and awarded $20,000 in compensatory damages (for plain-
tiff's claimed mental anguish and shame as a result of being branded a
thief) and $55,000 in punitive damages.86
Examining the issue under a plain error standard, because the defen-
dant failed to preserve the issue for review by objecting to the jury in-
structions,87 the court recognized its "strict interpretation of retaliation
claims" and held that "an employer's filing of a counterclaim cannot sup-
port a retaliation claim in the Fifth Circuit."'88 The court reasoned that "a
counterclaim filed after the employee has already been discharged "in no
way resembles the ultimate employment decisions" described by Title VII
or the ADEA.89 The court also supported its holding by acknowledging
that companies and citizens have constitutional rights to file lawsuits,
tempered by the requirement that the suits have an arguable basis.90
The Fifth Circuit's decision in Fabela v. Socorro Independent School
District brings the potential implications of Desert Palace into sharper fo-
cus. 91 In Fabela, the plaintiff worked as a campus secretary in the




85. Id. at 529-30.
86. Id. at 530.
87. Id. at 531.
88. Id. at 532-33.
89. Id. at 533.
90. Id. at 532.
91. Fabela v. Socorro Indep. Sch. Dist., 329 F.3d 409 (5th Cir. 2003).
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Socorro Independent School District (the District) for eleven years
before being terminated for poor performance and persistent insubordi-
nation.92 At the termination review session, when asked why the District
wished to terminate plaintiff, it responded that Fabela was a "problem
employee. ' 93 Among the evidence the District used to substantiate this
characterization was an EEOC letter of determination written in re-
sponse to sex discrimination and harassment claims Fabela had filed six
years earlier-claims that the EEOC concluded were unsubstantiated
and uncorroborated. The District read the EEOC letter aloud during the
review session before submitting it as evidence. 94
The review session leader "returned a finding in support of the Dis-
trict's decision to dismiss Fabela. '' 95 She filed a timely retaliation charge
with the EEOC and a subsequent lawsuit, claiming that her termination
was in retaliation for filing the 1991 EEOC charges. 96 However, the trial
court granted the District's summary judgment motion, "finding that
Fabela failed to provide evidence establishing a causal [link] between the
1991 charge and her 1997 dismissal" so a reasonable jury could believe
they were connected. 97 The Fifth Circuit reversed.
The Fifth Circuit first explained the analytical paths a Title VII plaintiff
can travel-the "mixed-motive" path available for plaintiffs presenting
direct evidence of retaliation, or the "less advantageous path."98 The Mc-
Donnell Douglas burden-shifting path allows a plaintiff with only circum-
stantial evidence to create a rebuttable presumption of retaliation. The
court explained that "direct evidence" includes any statement or docu-
ment that shows on its face that an improper criterion served as a basis-
not necessarily the sole basis, but a basis-for the adverse employment
action." 99
Fabela's direct evidence, describing her as a "problem employee" and
pointing to her filing an unsubstantiated charge as evidence and having
the EEOC's determination letter read aloud, showed that retaliation was
among the motives which prompted the adverse action. 1°° Thus, in accor-
dance with the "mixed-motive" analysis, the burden of proof then shifted
to the District to prove that the same decision would have been made
regardless of the forbidden factor.10 1
Although the trial court properly characterized the evidence as "di-
rect," the court evaluated her direct evidence for persuasiveness as com-
pared to the record as a whole. 10 2 The Fifth Circuit found this as error.
92. Id. at 411.




97. Id. at 414.
98. Id. at 414-15.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 416-17.
101. Id. at 417.
102. Id. at 416.
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According to the Fifth Circuit, the trial court should have assessed
whether Fabela produced direct evidence sufficient to allow her to avoid
the McDonnell Douglas framework instead of weighing the evidence and
preemptively determining whether and which inferences a reasonable
jury would draw. Because the direct evidence here was sufficient to sup-
port a causal nexus, the element of causation was established. Addition-
ally, even though the District provided unrebutted evidence of a
legitimate reason for the termination, the court held that this was insuffi-
cient to secure summary judgment under the direct evidence calculus. In
other words, "the fact that the District supplied and supported a legiti-
mate reason for discharging Fabela merely means that the District, too,
has met its requirement to show that judgment as a matter of law cannot
be rendered against it, and the issue is ripe for trial. ' 103
The effect of the Desert Palace holding on the Fabela court's analysis
remains uncertain. To some degree, the Fabela opinion is a guide to un-
derstanding the court's gatekeeper role to the direct evidence rubric be-
cause, as the court clarified, the proper question in that case was whether
the plaintiff succeeded in producing sufficient direct evidence to allow her
to avoid the McDonnell Douglas framework. However, if direct evidence
is not a prerequisite to obtaining a mixed-motive jury instruction under
Title VII as Desert Palace instructs, 1°4 would plaintiff avoid McDonnell
Douglas even without the direct evidence she provided? In the Fabela
case, probably not because the plaintiff only had the direct evidence to
support her causal nexus element. Because it is the unusual instance
where a plaintiff is able to support the elements of a claim with direct
evidence of a retaliatory motive, 105 the question the courts will be an-
swering in the cases following Desert Palace is what quantum and quality
of circumstantial evidence does a plaintiff need to provide to avoid the
McDonnell Douglas framework?10 6 Or, in the language of Desert Palace,
what quantum and quality of circumstantial evidence "demonstrates"
that an employer used a forbidden consideration with respect to any em-
ployment practice?10 7
103. Id. at 418.
104. Desert Palace, 123 S. Ct. at 2155.
105. Fabela, 329 F.3d at 415.
106. See, e.g., Hook v. Ernst & Young, 28 F.3d 366, 373 (3d Cir. 1994) ("Whether a
pretext or a mixed-motives case has been presented depends on the kind of circumstantial
evidence the employee produces."); Ostrowski v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Cos., 968 F.2d 171, 182
(2d Cir. 1992) (requiring circumstantial evidence "tied directly to the alleged discrimina-
tory animus").
107. This also appears to comport with the language of Price Waterhouse and Reeves.
In Price Waterhouse the Court illuminated the court's role, explaining that "the District
Court must decide whether a particular case involves mixed motives. If the plaintiff fails to
satisfy the fact finder that it is more likely than not that a forbidden characteristic played a
part in the employment decision, then she may prevail only if she proves, following Bur-
dine, that the employer's stated reason for its decision is pretextual." Price Waterhouse,
490 U.S. at 247 n.12. In Reeves, the Court rejected a "pretext-plus" requirement on plain-
tiffs and held that a plaintiff's prima facie case combined with sufficient evidence of falsity
may permit a finding of intentional discrimination. However, the Court admonished that




Prior to its 1998 holdings in Faragher v. City of Boca Raton10 8 and Bur-
lington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth,10 9 many courts struggled with the rules
for analyzing a sexual harassment case, trying to figure out which of the
two subsets a particular case should be analyzed under: hostile work envi-
ronment or "quid pro quo harassment." In hostile environment cases,
some courts applied a negligence standard and allowed employers to de-
fend themselves by demonstrating the prompt remedial action taken
upon learning of the offending conduct. 110 Some courts applied the same
standard in quid pro quo cases while others applied a strict liability stan-
dard.111 The Supreme Court's abandonment of those dichotomies in its
Faragher and Ellerth opinions signaled to some that the Court had
adopted a "bright line" rule for analyzing sexual harassment cases." 12
The issuance of the Fifth Circuit's 2003 opinion in Ackel v. National Com-
munications, Inc.113 demonstrates that questions remain five years after
Faragher and Ellerth.
In its Faragher and Ellerth opinions, the Court addressed the issue of
an employer's vicarious liability for employee sexual harassment and es-
tablished an affirmative defense that may be raised in hostile environ-
ment cases. The Court held that
[a]n employer is subject to vicarious liability to a victimized em-
ployee for an actionable hostile environment created by a supervisor
with immediate (or successively higher) authority over the employee.
When no tangible employment action is taken, a defending employer
may raise an affirmative defense to liability or damages .... The
defense comprises two necessary elements: (a) that the employer ex-
ercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually
harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff employee unreasonably
failed to take advantage of any preventative or corrective opportuni-
ties provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise. 114
judgment as a matter of law is warranted where "plaintiff created only a weak issue of fact"
as to falsity. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 148 (emphasis in original). To hold otherwise, the Court
explained "would effectively insulate an entire category of employment discrimination
cases from review under Rule 50" [and Rule 56]. Id.; see Evans v. City of Bishop, 238 F.3d
586, 592 (5th Cir. 2000) (describing Reeves standard as summary judgment standard).
108. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
109. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
110. Hirras v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 95 F.3d 396, 399 (5th Cir. 1996); Torres v.
Pisano, 116 F.3d 625, 633 (2d Cir. 1997).
111. Sims v. Brown & Root Indus. Servs., Inc., 889 F. Supp. 920, 925 (W.D. La. 1995),
affd 78 F.3d 581 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 817 (1996); Kauffman v. Allied
Signal, Inc., 970 F.2d 178, 186 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1041 (1992); Jansen v.
Packaging Corp. of Am., 123 F.3d 490, 495 (7th Cir. 1997); Karibian v. Columbia Univ., 14
F.3d 773, 777 (2d Cir. 1994).
112. See generally, Kelly Collins Woodford & Harry A. Rissetto, Tangible Employment
Action: What Did the Supreme Court Really Mean in Faragher and Ellerth?, 19 THE LABOR
LAWYER 33, 63 (2003)
113. Ackel v. Nat'l Communications, Inc. 339 F.3d 376 (5th Cir. 2003).
114. Farragher, 524 U.S. at 807.
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The issue confronting the Fifth Circuit in Ackel was whether employers
can raise the Faragher/Ellerth affirmative defense in cases not involving a
tangible employment action. In Ackel, the Fifth Circuit declined this in-
terpretation of Faragher and Ellerth and expanded the scope of automatic
vicarious liability in Title VII supervisory sexual harassment cases in
holding that an employer is vicariously liable in two types of situations:
(1) when there is a tangible employment action, or (2) when the harassing
employee is a proxy for the employer.1 15
The Ackel plaintiffs presented summary judgment evidence that at the
time of the harassment, the alleged harasser was the employer's President
and General Manager as well as a stockholder and member of the board
of directors. 116 Although the employer attempted to argue that he was
not the corporation's proxy, with evidence that he owned only two per-
cent of the stock and consulted the corporation's outside CPA before
awarding raises, the court rejected such arguments because "the only fac-
tor relevant to the determination of whether [the alleged harasser] was a
proxy.. .is whether he held a 'sufficiently high position in the manage-
ment hierarchy' so as to speak for the corporate employer. '11 7
In a "special concurrence," Judge Garza disagreed with the majority's
conclusion that the Supreme Court intended to bar the assertion of an
affirmative defense when the supervisor happens to be of sufficiently high
rank to qualify as the employer's proxy.'1 8 Instead, Judge Garza stated,
"we are bound, absent a tangible employment action, to apply the de-
fense to the [plaintiff's] sexual harassment claims." 119 This, he reasoned,
was compelled by the Supreme Court's explanation that "employers can-
not, as a general matter, be held automatically liable for sexual harass-
ment by their supervisors. ' 120 Judge Garza also explained that the
Supreme Court enumerated the affirmative defense to counter the risk of
automatic liability. The Supreme Court sought to avoid, and explicitly
limited, automatic vicarious liability to circumstances in which "the su-
pervisor's harassment culminates in a tangible employment action .... ,1121
In contrast to Ackel, the Texas Court of Appeals, in Gulf States Toyota,
Inc. v. Morgan,122 suggested that in sexual harassment claims under the
TCHRA, it is the employee's burden to prove that the employer knew or
should have known of the harassment and did not take prompt, remedial
action. In Gulf States Toyota, the plaintiff was assigned a job at Gulf
States Toyota by a temporary employment agency working at the car
wash exit and was responsible for moving cars to another location. On
115. Ackel, 339 F.3d at 383.
116. Id. at 384.
117. Id. (citing Faragher, 524 U.S. at 789 (citation omitted)).
118. Id. at 386 (Garza, J., specially concurring).
119. Id.
120. Id. at 387 (citing Faragher, 524 U.S. at 792).
121. Id. at 387.




her first day, a co-worker made improper comments to her but she did
not complain about these comments. A few months later, the co-worker
was assigned to the same area as plaintiff and made several lewd com-
ments and gestures and rubbed plaintiff's breasts. The next day, after the
co-worker continued the harassing behavior, plaintiff complained to her
supervisor at Gulf States Toyota. The supervisor told her that the harass-
ment violated company policies and would not be tolerated. He also of-
fered to reassign the co-worker to another area. The following day,
plaintiff reported the harassment to the temporary agency and made a
written statement regarding the complaint which was also provided to
Gulf States Toyota.
Gulf States Toyota's human resource manager, upon returning from
her vacation, was first advised of the complaint. She called the plaintiff
into her office and told her that an investigation would be conducted.
The investigation did not reveal any witnesses who could confirm plain-
tiff's complaints, however, several women said they knew of inappropri-
ate remarks made by the alleged harasser. A few days later, plaintiff
complained that the co-worker had come up to her and grabbed his
crotch and shaken it while looking at her. The human resources manager
gave her the rest of the day off with pay and gave the co-worker a final
warning, transferred him to another building, and admonished him to
leave plaintiff alone.
Plaintiff's subsequent lawsuit alleged that Gulf States Toyota subjected
her to sexual harassment and the jury found in her favor.123 On appeal,
the court reiterated that in order for a plaintiff "[t]o establish a claim for
sexual harassment by a co-worker, a plaintiff must show that (1) she be-
longs to a protected group; (2) she was subjected to unwelcome harass-
ment; (3) the harassment was based on sex; (4) the harassment affected a
term, condition, or privilege of her employment; and (5) her employer
knew or should have known of the harassment and did not take prompt,
remedial action. ' 124 Gulf States Toyota did not challenge the first three
elements, but contended that the plaintiff did not establish elements four
and five. 125
The court did not need to address the fourth element because it con-
cluded that plaintiff failed to establish element five. Plaintiff contended
that the action taken was neither prompt nor remedial, arguing that Gulf
States Toyota (1) did not adopt a sexual harassment policy and did not
communicate it to all employees, (2) did not immediately separate her
from the harassing co-worker, (3) did not sufficiently remove the harass-
ing co-worker from the workplace during the investigation, (4) did not
provide the harassing co-worker with remedial training, (5) did not en-
sure that her workplace would be free from harassment, or (6) did not
123. Id. at 770.
124. Id. at 770 (citing Green v. Indus. Specialty Contractors, Inc., 1 S.W.3d 126, 131
(Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.)).
125. Id. at 770-71.
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provide sufficient penalty to the harassing co-worker.126 Notably, Gulf
States did have and communicate the anti-harassment policy, a copy of
which was given to plaintiff.
127
The court rejected plaintiff's argument, reasoning that appropriate re-
medial action necessarily "depends on the particular facts of the case-
the severity and persistence of the harassment, and the effectiveness of
any initial remedial steps.' 128 The employer, the court held, "may be lia-
ble despite having taken remedial steps if the plaintiff can establish that
the employer's response was not 'reasonably calculated' to halt the
harassment. "1 2 9
In this case, however, the employer took immediate action upon hear-
ing plaintiff's complaint, subsequently moved the harasser to a station
away from plaintiff, and investigated the complaint. When a second inci-
dent was reported, the employer took immediate action by verbally repri-
manding the harasser, placing a written reprimand in his personnel file,
telling him that it was his final warning, and suspending him without pay
for five days. Also, after this disciplinary action, the plaintiff did not re-
turn to work to see whether the action did, in fact, stop the harassment.
The court, therefore, held that the employer's responses were prompt,
remedial, and reasonably calculated to halt the harassment as a matter of
law.130
b. Age Discrimination
In Julian v. City of Houston,131 the plaintiff was a sixty-year-old
firefighter who had been working for the City of Houston since 1968.
Although Julian had been promoted to District Chief of the City's fire
department in 1984, the City denied him promotion to Assistant Fire
Chief five times since 1989. On October 10, 1995, Julian filed a charge of
discrimination alleging racial discrimination in violation of Title VII.132
The EEOC subsequently issued a right-to-sue notice and he filed suit
against the City. Julian filed a second charge with the EEOC on March 5,
1999 that included both race and age discrimination. The EEOC issued
another right-to-sue notice, but the notice only addressed the Title VII
claim. The district court allowed him to amend his complaint to include
the age discrimination claim.133
After the district court granted the City's summary judgment motion
on the Title VII claims, the case went to trial on the ADEA claim alone
126. Id. at 771.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. (citing Skidmore v. Precision Printing & Packaging, Inc., 188 F.3d 606, 615-16
(5th Cir. 1999)).
130. Id. at 773.
131. Julian v. City of Houston, 314 F.3d 721, 724 (5th Cir. 2002).
132. Id.
133. Id. at 725.
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which produced a jury verdict in favor of plaintiff. 134 However, on ap-
peal, the City argued that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction be-
cause plaintiff did not obtain a right-to-sue letter prior to filing his
ADEA claim. 135
The Fifth Circuit ruled that a plaintiff's receipt of a right-to-sue notice
from the EEOC is not a prerequisite to filing an ADEA cause of ac-
tion. 136 The court cautioned that there are preconditions to bringing a
suit under the ADEA.137 For example, 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) provides that,
for cases proceeding in Texas, a complainant must file within 300 days of
the last act of discrimination. 138 Additionally, § 626(d) provides that a
person seeking relief under the ADEA must first file an administrative
charge with the EEOC and that the complainant must wait sixty days
after a charge has been filed to bring suit.139 Thus, under § 626(d), the
claimant's independent right to sue arises automatically upon the expira-
tion of sixty days after filing the charge with the EEOC. 140
The court also rejected the City's argument that 29 U.S.C. § 626(e) re-
quires receipt of a right-to-sue notice as an additional prerequisite to fil-
ing an ADEA lawsuit. That section provides that if a charge filed with
the EEOC is dismissed or the proceedings are otherwise terminated, the
EEOC must notify the complainant, who may then bring a civil action
within ninety days after receipt of the EEOC notice. That section, the
court reasoned, is irrelevant in cases such as this one where Julian
brought the action after the sixty day waiting period but before the
EEOC responds to the charge. 14 1 Therefore, following Julian, "the win-
dow for filing an ADEA lawsuit begins sixty days after filing the EEOC
charge and ends ninety days after receipt of the EEOC right to sue
notice."1 4
2
In the case of Palasota v. Haggar Clothing Co., 1 4 3 the plaintiff was em-
ployed as a Sales Associate by Haggar for twenty-eight years before be-
ing terminated in 1996 at the age of fifty-one. He was considered an
"outstanding" employee who had "great relationships with customers"
and "was second to none in his sales professionalism." Palasota was re-
sponsible for handling one of Haggar's lucrative key accounts, Dillard's
Department Stores, as well as eight J.C. Penney's key accounts and vari-
ous trade accounts. 144
The company, however, decided to transfer the sales functions per-









142. Adams v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 838 F. Supp. 1461, 1467-68 (D. Kan. 1993).




Associates" ("RMA"). 14 5 This was done to "portray a younger image for
the company. ' 146 Indeed, ninety-five percent of the RMAs were females
in their late twenties and early thirties; whereas ninety-five percent of
Sales Associates were males between forty-five and fifty-five years of
age. 147 From 1993 to 1996, the company hired between thirty-two and
fifty-one sales people, all of them RMAs and all but four of whom were
under forty years of age. During the same period, the company termi-
nated seventeen Sales Associates, all of whom were males over forty.148
In late 1995, Haggar lost its account with Dillard's, which constituted
about eighty-five percent of Palasota's commissions. Although the then-
existing National Sales Manager created a new territory consisting of J.C.
Penney stores, key accounts that would generate eighty-five to ninety
percent of Palasota's commission amount, Palasota never acquired the
territory because a new National Sales Manager was installed and refused
to grant Palasota the promised territory. Instead of assigning him to key
accounts, the new manager relegated Palasota to less lucrative trade ac-
counts in East Texas and Louisiana.
Palasota was offered the option of accepting the trade accounts or a
severance package, which Palasota rejected. In February 1996, a memo
was circulated among Haggar management that
we have approximately [fourteen] associates with this same amount
of tenure who are in their early fifties or older, [and recommended
that] Human Resources look at developing a severance package for
these individuals .... This could provide us the ability to thin the
ranks in a fashion that will create good will and ease the anxiety of
this transition period ... .149
Although the J.C. Penney's accounts were available, in March 1996, the
company notified Palasota that he would be terminated. In April 1996,
Palasota received a letter "that his position was being 'eliminated' due to
a 'reconfiguration of the sales force." 150 The company assigned the J.C.
Penney's accounts to other Sales Associates, but by 1997 those Associates
were terminated and replaced by younger RMAs. Moreover, between
the end of 1996 and March 1998, the company terminated twelve Sales
Associates over forty, including Palasota, and hired thirteen new RMAs,
only one of whom was over forty.151
The company tried to portray the termination of Palasota as "an effec-
tive resignation resulting from his dissatisfaction with the low commission
yield of his new territory and the severance package. ' 152 However, at the
trial of his ADEA claim, Palasota produced evidence that the company





150. Id. at 573.
151. Id. at 572.
152. Id. at 573.
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was concerned with its appearance of having an aging sales force. For
example, in late 1995, Haggar's President, Frank Bracken, stated that he
wanted "race horses" and not "plow horses." He also told Palasota that
he was from the "old school" of sales. Bracken also announced at a
meeting that there was a significant "graying of the sales force." In re-
turning a verdict in favor of Palasota, the jury awarded Palasota over
$840,000 in backpay. The district court, however, granted the company's
Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law, finding that Palasota had failed
to demonstrate that the company had given preferential treatment to a
younger employee. The court also found that all of the age-related com-
ments were "stray remarks" and therefore not probative of discrimina-
tory intent. 153
Following its de novo review, the Fifth Circuit ruled that the district
court had erred by: (1) holding that Palasota was required to show that a
younger employee was given preferential treatment, (2) ignoring the evi-
dence contained in the memo, and (3) discounting the probative value of
the management's age-related remarks.1 54 Following Reeves, the court
admonished that Palasota's establishment of a prima facie case combined
with doubt cast on the company's proffered supposed nondiscriminatory
reason for terminating him (that Palasota effectively resigned) was suffi-
cient to support liability. 155 The plain language of the termination letter
was enough evidence of falsity for a reasonable jury to infer that the com-
pany was dissembling to cover up its discriminatory purpose.
On the issue of whether Palasota was required to show that a younger
employee was treated more favorably, the court clarified that this is not
the only way to prove age discrimination. Because the company charac-
terized the dispute as one arising out of a reduction-in-force, "the plain-
tiff need only show evidence, circumstantial or direct, from which a
factfinder might reasonably conclude that the employer intended to dis-
criminate in reaching the decision at issue."1 56 Therefore, Palasota was
not required to show preferential treatment to a younger employee or
replacement by an RMA.
In its Palasota decision, the Fifth Circuit also breathed life into the
"stray remarks" doctrine. In the Wyvill case, decided pre-Reeves, the
court reasoned that for an age-based comment to be probative of an em-
ployer's discriminatory intent, it must be direct and unambiguous, al-
lowing a reasonable jury to conclude without any inferences or
presumptions that age was a determinative factor in the decision to termi-
nate the employee. 157 In Palasota, however, the court concluded that
post-Reeves, remarks are probative of discriminatory intent "so long as
153. Id. at 573-74.
154. Id. at 575.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 576.
157. Wyvill v. United Cos. Life Ins. Co., 212 F.3d 296, 304 (5th Cir. 2000), cert. denied,
531 U.S. 1145 (2001).
[Vol. 57
Employment Law
such remarks are not the only evidence of pretext. '158
Notably, the company argued that the remarks were not really age-
based or connected in time to the termination; rather, the comments were
"objective observations, ambiguous, and insufficient to infer discrimina-
tion."' 159 The Fifth Circuit rejected these arguments, stating that the court
held a more "cautious" view of the stray remarks doctrine. 160 "[E]ven
where the comment is not in the direct context of the termination and
even if uttered by one other than the formal decisionmaker," provided
that the individual is in a position to influence the employment decision,
"[a]ge-related remarks are appropriately taken into account" when ana-
lyzing the evidence supporting the jury's verdict. 61 In the instant case,
the speakers of the remarks were members of upper management.
Therefore, alongside the prima facie case and Palasota's evidence of fal-
sity, the remarks were probative of discriminatory intent.
c. Disability Discrimination
During this Survey period, federal courts continued to sort out the
rights of non-disabled plaintiffs under the ADA that nevertheless sue
under theories of disability discrimination based on the "record of such
an impairment" and "regarded as having such an impairment" provisions
of the Act.162 In Gowesky v. Singing River Hospital System, the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's order on summary
judgment in favor of Singing River Hospital System ("Singing River") in
a suit under the ADA filed by an emergency room physician infected with
Hepatitis C. 163 The plaintiff, Gowesky, was an emergency room physician
for Singing River that contracted Hepatitis C in 1997 while caring for a
patient. Although she took a leave of absence to treat her condition, she
continued to attend staff meetings for almost two years after she was
diagnosed.164
In 1999, Gowesky informed the hospital that the virus had gone into
remission and she desired to return to work.165 Her supervisor expressed
doubt as to whether she could work in the emergency room with Hepati-
tis C and informed her that he would seek the advice of the hospital at-
torneys. 166 The supervisor additionally informed Gowesky that she was
required to obtain a full release from her physicians and complete a re-
fresher course in emergency medicine. 167 At a later staff meeting, Sing-
158. Palasota, 342 F.3d at 577.
159. Id. at 578.
160. Id. (citing Russell v. McKinney Hosp. Venture, 235 F.3d 219, 229 (5th Cir. 2000)).
161. Id.
162. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(2)(B), (2)(C) (Vernon Supp. 2004) (the definition of "disabil-
ity" under the ADA includes persons with a record of impairment and persons regarded as
having an impairment).







ing River scheduled Gowesky to return to work on June 1, 1999.168 She
alleged that at the same staff meeting, her supervisors made threatening
and offensive remarks. 169 Gowesky claimed that she engaged in numer-
ous discussions with Singing River over a four-month period in which
they made further offensive remarks. In May 1999, Gowesky mistakenly
determined that Singing River fired her.170
Gowesky did not return to work on June 1, but instead, filed suit
against Singing River, asserting disability-based workplace harassment
and employment discrimination.1 71 Gowesky alleged that although she is
not disabled under 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A), she has a claim under the
ADA because she was "regarded as disabled" by her employer.1 72
Although the Fifth Circuit recognized that the ADA permits claims by
plaintiffs that are "regarded as disabled," but not actually disabled under
§ 12102(2)(A), it rejected Gowesky's assertion that Singing River re-
garded her as disabled because the hospital actually assigned her to re-
turn to work in the emergency room. Therefore, the hospital could not
have considered her unable to perform the essential functions of an emer-
gency room physician. 73 The court noted that, in expressing concern
about the plaintiff's ability to work in the emergency room, the hospital
officials did not imply that they believed that she was disabled to perform
the functions of her position in a less exposed or less exposing environ-
ment. 174 Although the Fifth Circuit acknowledged a cause of action for
plaintiffs that are not actually disabled, the court seemingly requires more
than a mere expression of concern over a plaintiff's ability to work in a
particular position.
As for plaintiffs asserting claims under the traditional definition of
"disabled," federal courts continued to narrow the definition of disability
during this Survey period-making it more difficult for an employee to
establish a disability based on a physical or mental impairment that af-
fects that employee's ability to work. In Waldrip v. General Electric
Corp., the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's
summary judgment in favor of GE, finding that Waldrip, afflicted with
chronic pancreatitis, does not have a disability as defined by the ADA.175
William Waldrip worked at a General Electric ("GE") plant where he
operated heavy machinery when he was diagnosed with chronic pancrea-
titis, a condition that caused him to occasionally miss a few days of
work. 176 To treat his condition, Waldrip was prescribed medication, which
carried a warning against operating heavy machinery. Company doctors,
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 507.
171. Id.
172. Gowesky, 321 F.3d at 508; 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C) (Vernon Supp. 2004).
173. Gowesky, 321 F.3d at 508.
174. Id.




noting the warning label against use of heavy machinery, told Waldrip he
could not work while under the influence of the medications. Waldrip
claimed he was fired, and he did not return to work. 177 He then filed a
disability discrimination claim under the ADA.
178
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that although chronic
pancreatitis can substantially limit the major life activity of eating, Wald-
rip did not present evidence that in his particular case, pancreatitis lim-
ited his eating.179 It is not enough to show that impairment could
substantially limit a major life activity. 180 Waldrip was required to show
that his impairment actually and substantially limited his particular major
life activity of eating in order to survive summary judgment.181 Here,
Waldrip made a general assertion that "pancreatitis is a serious condition
that substantially limits his major life function of eating" without provid-
ing evidence that his particular case of pancreatitis substantially limits his
ability to eat.182
The Fifth Circuit arrived at a similar conclusion in addressing a plaintiff
diagnosed with muscular dystrophy. 183 Carey McClure applied for a po-
sition with General Motors Corporation (GM) as an industrial journey-
man electrician. GM offered McClure a position and required McClure to
undergo a physical examination. 184 After discovering that McClure could
not raise his arms above shoulder level, GM withdrew its offer of employ-
ment. McClure, diagnosed in 1998 with muscular dystrophy, filed suit
against GM asserting disability discrimination under the ADA.185
The District Court for the Northern District of Texas determined, and
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, that McClure is not disabled
within the meaning of the ADA. 186 The court noted that McClure is able
to "perform all daily life activities without assistance from others."'1 87
Thus, McClure does not meet the definition of disabled under the ADA,
which requires proof that a physical or mental impairment substantially
limits one or more of the major life activities.188 The court emphasized
that "the inability to perform one specific job or a narrow range of jobs
does not constitute substantial limitation on one's ability to work. ' 189
The Texas Court of Appeals additionally tightened the reins on the
Texas Commission on Human Rights Act (TCHRA) in Columbia Plaza
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 655.
180. Id. at 656.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 656-57.
183. McClure v. General Motors Corp., No. 4:01-CV-878-A, 2003 WL 124480, at * 1
(N.D. Tex. Jan. 10, 2003).
184. Id.
185. Id. at *1.
186. Id. at *2.
187. Id. at *4.
188. Id. at *34.
189. Id. at *5 (citing Pryor v. Trane Co., 138 F.3d 1024, 1027 (5th Cir. 1998)).
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Medical Center v. Szurek.190 In that case, Plaintiff Carol Szurek filed suit
against Columbia Plaza Medical Center of Fort Worth Subsidiary, L.P.
("Columbia") under the TCHRA, claiming that Columbia discriminated
against her based on a perceived disability. Following foot surgery in
February 1996, Szurek took six weeks off from her position as a medical
technologist in Columbia's microbiology department.1 91 Szurek's podia-
trist allowed her to return to work after six weeks as long as she only
performed sedentary duties until full recovery. Four months after re-
turning to work, Szurek's doctor wrote a letter stating that Szurek needed
to continue performing only sedentary activities for at least three more
months.192 Based on the letter, Columbia reviewed Szurek's work condi-
tions and determined that there were no completely sedentary positions
available, including the position Szurek had filled since her return to
work, and placed Szurek on a three month leave of absence.1 93 Szurek
returned to work in March 1997 and continued to work at Columbia for
over a year until she resigned over an alleged salary dispute.
Szurek argued that she was placed on a leave of absence because Co-
lumbia perceived her as suffering from an impairment as defined under
the TCHRA, which allows discrimination claims for individuals that are
not necessarily impaired but nevertheless are regarded as having a sub-
stantially limiting impairment.1 94 A jury found that Columbia regarded
Szurek as having a disability and discriminated against her based on the
perceived disability.1 95 On review, the Texas Second Court of Appeals
noted that there was no evidence that Columbia believed that Szurek's
impairment was long-term or permanent-only temporary.1 96 In revers-
ing the lower court's judgment, the Court of Appeals emphasized that a
temporary impairment is not a substantially limiting impairment and thus
does not meet the threshold definition of impairment as defined by the
TCHRA. 197
In Little v. Texas Department of Criminal Justice, the Texas Court of
Appeals addressed whether a job applicant, whose leg was amputated
and who wore a prosthesis, was disabled under the TCHRA. 198 Little, an
amputee who walks with a noticeable limp, applied with the Texas De-
partment of Criminal Justice (TDCJ) as a food service manager on four-
teen different occasions without being offered a position. 19 9 Little filed
suit against the TDCJ, claiming disability discrimination under the
190. Columbia Plaza Med. Ctr. v. Szurek, 101 S.W.3d 161,164 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth
2003, no pet.).
191. Id. at 164-65.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 165.
194. Id.; TEx. LAB. CODE ANN. § 21.002(6) (Vernon Supp. 2004).
195. Id. at 164.
196. Id. at 167-68.
197. Id. at 168.
198. Little v. Tex. Dept. of Criminal Justice, No. 01-02-00733-CV, 2003 WL 1563739, at




TCHRA.200 TDCJ moved for summary judgment asserting that 1) Little
failed to establish that she is disabled, or perceived as disabled, as defined
by the TCHRA, 2) Little could not show that she was the best candidate
for the job, and 3) Little could not demonstrate evidence of intentional
discrimination. 20 1 The trial court granted TDCJ's motion for summary
judgment without explanation.202
In affirming the trial court's judgment, the appeals court noted that
although Little walked slowly and with a limp, she could still walk well.
20 3
The court relied on the Fifth Circuit decision, Talk v. Delta Airlines, Inc.,
which concluded that a plaintiff that walked with a slight limp was not
disabled because "some impairment in her ability to walk ... does not
rise to the level of substantial impairment required by the ADA and
TCHRA. ' '2° 4 In Little's case, the court similarly found that while there
was some evidence of Little's impairment, her condition did not consti-
tute a substantial limitation of a major life activity as required by the
TCHRA.20
5
3. Family & Medical Leave Act
In 2003, the courts continued to provide contours to the rapidly devel-
oping body of law surrounding the FMLA as the federal law celebrated
its ten-year anniversary. Some of the cases during the Survey period indi-
cate that the courts are still grappling with the "technical" aspects of the
FMLA. Farris v. Williams WPC-I, Inc.20 6 and Urban v. Dolgencorp of
Texas, Inc. 20 7 are good examples.
In Farris, the plaintiff received a memorandum advising that she had
forty-five days to consider and sign a release to waive rights to a claim
upon termination, and seven days to revoke it if she signed.20 8 She de-
cided to sign it and also received over $4,000 in return for signing. The
release purported to waive her rights under any "federal, state or local
law or regulation," but the release did not specifically mention the
FMLA.20 9 Plaintiff subsequently sued her employer for retaliation under
the FMLA. In its denial of defendant's summary judgment, the district
court held that the "plain language" of 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(d) dictates
that FMLA claims are not waivable.2 10 However, in reversing the district
court, the Fifth Circuit undertook to analyze § 825.220(d), which reads in
relevant part, "Employees cannot waive, nor may employers induce em-
200. Id. at *2.
201. Id. at *1.
202. Id.
203. Id. at *2.
204. Id. at *3 (quoting Talk v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 165 F.3d 1021, 1025 (5th Cir. 1999)).
205. Id.
206. Farris v. Williams WPC-I, Inc., 332 F.3d 316 (5th Cir. 2003).
207. Urban v. Dolgencorp of Tex., Inc., No. 1:02-CV-212-C, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
15334 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 6, 2003).





ployees to waive, their rights under FMLA. ''211
The court determined that the term "employee" is ambiguous because
in various contexts it refers to only current employees, but in other situa-
tions, it refers to former employees. 212 The court ultimately determined
that in the context of the regulation, employee refers to only current em-
ployees.2 13 Furthermore, the court interpreted the regulation to apply to
only waivers of substantive rights under the statute such as rights to leave
and reinstatement rather than to causes of action for retaliation or for
exit rights.2 14 Thus, the court concluded that the cause of action for retal-
iation is a protection for FMLA rights, the waiver of which is not prohib-
ited by 29 C.F.R. § 825.200(d). 2 15
In Urban v. Dolgen Corp. of Texas, the plaintiff notified her employer
that because of upcoming surgery she was requesting a medical leave of
absence pursuant to the FMLA.216 The employee requested leave that
would begin on June 1, 2002 and last through August 24, 2002. Her em-
ployer informed her on or about June 4th that it was tentatively designat-
ing her requested leave of absence as FMLA qualifying. The employer
also informed plaintiff that she would have to produce a medical certifica-
tion from her physician to approve the leave under the FMLA. 217 Plain-
tiff was informed that the deadline to return the medical certification
form was June 24, 2002. However, plaintiff requested and was granted a
fifteen-day extension of time within which to return the completed medi-
cal certification form.218
Despite the fact that plaintiff said she delivered the required medical
certification to her physician, the physician's office lost the form and con-
sequently never sent the employer a copy of the medical certification.21 9
Thus, when the employer found that she had not submitted the required
certification form by the extended deadline, the employer terminated
plaintiff's employment "because her thirty days of non-FMLA medical
leave ... had expired, and the company considered her absences unau-
thorized. 12 20 Plaintiff however contended that she was unaware that the
certification had not been submitted by her physician and "did not learn
of this fact until she was notified that her request for FMLA leave was
denied. 22 1
The issue confronting the court, like the case in Farris, was an interpre-
tation of an FMLA regulation-in this case it was § 825.305(d). That reg-
ulation states in relevant part that an employer "shall advise an employee
211. Id. at 319.
212. Id. at 319-20.
213. Id. at 320.
214. Id. at 322.
215. Id.
216. Urban, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15334, at *3.
217. Id.
218. Id. at *2-3.





whenever the employer finds a certification incomplete and provide the
employee a reasonable opportunity to cure any such deficiency.
222
Plaintiff argued that because employees are entitled under this regulation
to cure any deficiencies whenever they are found, she should have given a
reasonable opportunity to provide anything that was missing. This, she
argued, would have included allowing her physician to simply fax the
medical certification to her employer within a reasonable time after she
was notified that her employer had failed to receive her form.22 3 On the
other hand, the defendant-employer attempted to distinguish the terms in
the regulation by asserting that the plaintiff's certification was not "in-
complete" at the time of the deadline but was nonexistent. Thus, an "em-
ployer cannot 'find' a medical certification 'incomplete' if it cannot find
the certification at all because the employee has missed the deadline for
submission. 22 4
The court sided with the plaintiff and characterized the defendant's ar-
gument as narrow.225 The court held that if the opportunity to cure
means anything under the regulation, it means that "employees must
have a chance to produce what is missing and to complete what was in-
complete. '226 Thus, because the plaintiff "was not advised that her medi-
cal certification was incomplete at the deadline and was given no
opportunity to cure the deficiency," the court found that the defendant
was in violation of the regulation.227
4. Fair Labor Standards Act
In last year's Survey, we highlighted the case of Shaw v. C.F. Datacorp
wherein the Northern District Court of Texas refused to remand an
FLSA case and joined the majority of courts that permit removal of these
cases. During its 2002-2003 term, the United States Supreme Court set-
tled the issue, conclusively determining that FLSA actions are removable
to federal court. In its opinion in Breuer v. Jim's Concrete of Brevard,
Inc., the Court rejected the plaintiff's argument that removal was im-
proper because FLSA Section 216(b) states that an action "may be main-
tained" in state court and was thus an express exception to Section
1441(a)'s general removal authorization.22 8
In Moore v. Hannan Food Service, the plaintiffs were employed as res-
taurant managers at various KFC restaurants throughout Mississippi at a
salary of $300 per week plus a monthly bonus of two percent of the gross
sales of the restaurant they managed. 229 The employer had a policy of
deducting recurrent cash register shortages from the supervising man-
222. 29 C.F.R. § 825.305(d) (2004).
223. Urban, 2003 U.S. Dist LEXIS 15334, at *8-9.
224. Id. at *9.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id. at *10.
228. Breuer v. Jim's Concrete of Brevard, Inc., 123 S. Ct. 1882, 1882-83 (2003).
229. Moore v. Hannon Food Serv., Inc., 317 F.3d 489, 491 (5th Cir. 2003).
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ager's monthly bonus. However, in November 1997, the employer began
deducting these shortages from the manager's weekly salary rather than
their monthly bonuses. This was done "ostensibly to increase the man-
ager's responsiveness to the problem. '230 However, during the four-
month period that these weekly deductions were made, the plaintiffs
were not considered exempt bona fide executive employees because they
were subject to improper deductions within the meaning of 29 C.F.R.
§ 541.118(a). 231
The plaintiffs sued Hannon on May 28, 1998 alleging violations of the
FLSA. On the eve of trial, "Hannon tendered plaintiffs the total amount
of all improper deductions plus an [eight percent] interest from the dates
of the deductions to September 18, 2000, the date then set for trial. '2 32
The defendant also moved for summary judgment arguing that Section
541.118(a)(6) allowed it to correct its error and maintain the exempt sta-
tus of the employees. The issue confronting the Fifth Circuit then was
whether the defendants had properly availed themselves of the "window
of correction" in the FLSA's regulations.
The window of correction established by Section 541.118(a)(6) reads as
follows:
The effect of making a deduction which is not permitted under these
interpretations will depend upon the facts in the particular case.
Where deductions are generally made when there is no work availa-
ble, it indicates that there was no intention to pay the employee on a
salary basis. In such a case the exemption would not be applicable to
him during the entire period when such deductions were being made.
On the other hand where a deduction not permitted by these inter-
pretations is inadvertent or is made for reasons other than lack of
work, the exemption will not be considered to have been lost if the
employer reimburses the employee for such deductions and promises
to comply in the future. 233
The Fifth Circuit concluded that the plain language of the regulation
sets out "inadvertence" and "'made for reasons other than lack of work'
as alternative grounds permitting corrective action. '2 34 In making this
conclusion, the Fifth Circuit declined to extend deference to the Secretary
of Labor's interpretation of this regulation. 235
5. Workers' Compensation & Retaliation
In Wingfoot Enterprises v. Alvarado, the Texas Supreme Court ad-
dressed the question of whether an employee can have more than one
employer for purposes of the Workers' Compensation Act and its exclu-
230. Id.
231. Id. at 492.
232. Id.
233. 29 C.F.R. § 541.118(a)(6) (2004).




sive remedy provision.2 36 Under its agreement with its customers to
whom it provides temporary labor, Wingfoot (d/b/a Tandem Staffing) had
sole responsibility for all aspects of hiring, screening, and terminating em-
ployees sent to a client's workplace, as well as responsibility for paying
employees' salaries and withholding taxes. There was, however, no ex-
press provision regarding workers' compensation coverage for temporary
workers, although the client in the case "assumed" that Tandem's fees
were "sufficient to cover the cost of workers' compensation
insurance. " 237
Tandem gave its employees details about their job assignments at the
client's worksite and provided basic safety equipment and training. Tan-
dem also had supervisors on-site at the client to check employees in, to
get them started working promptly, to issue them proper safety equip-
ment, and to monitor their breaks and lunch hours. The client supervised
the specific tasks performed by the temporary employees, but Tandem
retained the right to determine which employees would perform a partic-
ular task for clients, could substitute a different employee to perform a
particular task, and could reassign an employee to another task. Alva-
rado was hired to operate a staking or stamping machine at a client's
manufacturing facility, although it was against Tandem's policy for its em-
ployees to operate industrial machinery, a policy of which Alvarado was
aware. Alvarado did not notify Tandem about this assignment or that the
job was unsuitable or unsafe, although there was evidence that Tandem's
on-site supervisor knew Alvarado was operating the machine. 238
About two days after Alvarado began her assignment, the tips of three
of her fingers were severed while she was operating the machine. 239 At
the time of Alvarado's injury, Tandem maintained workers' compensa-
tion insurance coverage for Alvarado and its other employees. The client
also had workers' compensation insurance coverage for its employees.
Alvarado applied for and received workers' compensation benefits under
Tandem's policy, but she subsequently sued Tandem, claiming that it was
negligent and grossly negligent in a number of ways. Alvarado alleged
generally that Tandem failed to properly train and supervise her, warn
her of dangers, and provide her with a safe workplace. Alvarado also
sued the client.
Tandem sought and was granted summary judgment on the grounds
that the Texas Workers' Compensation Act's exclusive remedy provision
barred Alvarado's claims because Tandem was Alvarado's employer or
co-employer at the time she was injured.2 40 The court also rendered final
judgment in the client's favor based on the exclusive remedy provision.241
Alvarado appealed only the summary judgment in favor of Tandem. On
236. Wingfoot Enters. v. Alvarado, 111 S.W.3d 134, 134-35 (Tex. 2003).
237. Id. at 135.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 135-36.
241. Id. at 136.
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appeal, the court of appeals reversed the judgment on Alvarado's negli-
gence claim, holding that there was some evidence to support the
claim. 242 With regard to Tandem's contention that it is entitled to the
protection of the exclusive remedy provision of the Workers' Compensa-
tion Act, the court of appeals applied the common law "right of control"
test and concluded that an injured worker can have only one employer
for workers' compensation purposes and found there was a fact question
as to whether Tandem or the client was Alvarado's employer at the time
she was injured, precluding summary judgment in Tandem's favor.243
The Texas Supreme Court accepted the case to resolve differing views
among the courts of appeals as to whether a general employer that pro-
vides workers' compensation coverage for an employee is precluded from
relying on the exclusive remedy provision of the Workers' Compensation
Act if the employee was injured while the details of the employee's work
were under the control and supervision of another entity.244 Alvarado
contended that when the client took control of the details of her work,
she ceased to be an employee of Tandem for workers' compensation pur-
poses. "She argue[d] that when one entity 'borrows' another's employee,
workers' compensation law identifies one party as the employer and
treats all others as third parties. '245
The supreme court held that even if Alvarado was the client's bor-
rowed employee because it had the right to control and did control the
details of Alvarado's work at the time she was injured, such a determina-
tion was not controlling.246 The question, the court stated, was whether,
for purposes of workers' compensation, "a general employer like Tandem
remains an 'employer' within the meaning of the Act and thus whether
the exclusive remedy provision can apply to both the general employer
and one who has become an employer by controlling the details of a
worker's work at the time of injury. '247
The court reasoned that "Tandem hired Alvarado for the purpose of
sending her to its clients to work as a laborer. '248 The fact that she dis-
obeyed directives from Tandem about operating machinery while she was
on the job did not take her out of the course and scope of her employ-
ment with Tandem. 249 Also, the Act's definitions do not provide that a
general employer ceases to be the employee's employer for workers'
compensation purposes when another person exercises control over the
details of the employee's work. The Labor Code's overall scheme for
protecting workers has a decided bias in favor of employers electing to
242. Alvarado v. Wingfoot Enters., 53 S.W.3d 720, 726 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
2001, pet. granted), rev'd Wingfoot Enters. v. Alvarado, 111 S.W.3d 134 (Tex. 2003).
243. Id. at 725-26.
244. Wingfoot, 111 S.W.3d at 136-37.
245. Id. at 138-39.






provide coverage for their employees.250 These factors supported the su-
preme court's conclusion that the Act permits more than one employer
for workers' compensation purposes.
II. COMMON LAW CLAIMS
A. NEGLIGENCE-BASED CLAIMS
In last year's Survey period, the Texas Supreme Court issued its deci-
sion in Texas Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. v. Sears251 that signaled
its rejection of the tort of "negligent investigation" in the employment
context. We stated that an open question existed as to whether the court
would recognize other negligence-based claims, such as negligent drug
testing. The Texas Supreme Court, in its 2003 decision in Mission Petro-
leum Carriers, Inc. v. Solomon,252 addressed this exact issue in the con-
text of employers who conduct in-house urine specimen collection
pursuant to Department of Transportation (DOT) regulations.
In 1997, the plaintiff, Roy Solomon, was an at-will truck driver ran-
domly selected to provide a sample for drug testing.253
When Solomon arrived for the test, his immediate supervisor, termi-
nal manager Ed Hillebrandt, gave Solomon an unsealed collection
container that had been sitting exposed on a desk in the terminal
dispatcher's office. Solomon went unaccompanied into an adjacent
restroom to provide the specimen. Solomon returned to the dis-
patcher's office and set the collection container on the table. He then
went back to the restroom to wash his hands, leaving the container
behind. When he returned from the restroom approximately one
minute later, Hillebrandt divided the sample into two separate con-
tainers. Solomon then sealed each container, initialed the tamper-
proof seals, and placed the containers in a plastic bag. Solomon
signed an informed consent form confirming the "identity and integ-
rity of [the] sample throughout the collection and testing process. '254
Mission sent one of the containers to an independent laboratory for anal-
ysis; the other was set aside in the event further testing was required. The
laboratory analyzed the specimen and discovered THC metabolite, a
chemical produced by the human body after marijuana use. Solomon
"denied taking medication or any other product that might have caused
the THC metabolite to appear in his sample," but he did not "suggest
that the results might have been compromised by Mission's faulty collec-
tion procedures. '255 Solomon subsequently called Mission and requested
a retest, which Mission sent to a different laboratory. "[W]hen the sec-
250. Id. at 140.
251. Tex. Farm. Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sears, 84 S.W.3d 604 (Tex. 2002).
252. Mission Petroleum Carriers, Inc. v. Solomon, 106 S.W.3d 705 (Tex. 2003).





ond test also confirmed the presence of THC metabolite, Mission termi-
nated Solomon's employment.
The next day, Solomon applied for truck-driving positions at other em-
ployers, which were required to review Solomon's test results from previ-
ous employers for the preceding two years from the date of the
application. Consequently, Solomon signed a consent form authorizing
Mission to release the drug test results, which Mission reported. Solo-
mon's employment applications were rejected.25 6 Notably, "[e]ighty-four
days after the urine test, Solomon passed an independent laboratory's
hair-follicle test, which was designed to detect marijuana consump-
tion., 257
Solomon sued Mission for negligence and presented evidence that Mis-
sion violated DOT specimen collection protocols designed to ensure the
validity of the drug test result. The jury found that "Mission's negligence
proximately caused Solomon's injuries and awarded Solomon past and
future damages for medical care, loss of earning capacity, and mental
anguish totaling $802,444.22. The jury also assessed $100,000 in exem-
plary damages on a finding that Mission acted with malice. '258 The court
of appeals affirmed.25 9
The supreme court narrowly framed the question as whether an em-
ployer owes its employees a duty of care when collecting urine samples
for drug testing pursuant to DOT regulations. 260 Mission argued that the
court of appeals had "effectively created a new cause of action in Texas
for negligent termination."' 26' The Texas Supreme Court recognized that
other jurisdictions have refused to impose a common-law duty requiring
an employer's agent to comply with DOT protocols when the agent col-
lects samples for drug testing,2 62 and that the Fifth Circuit has rejected
liability for discharging at-will employees based on negligently conducted
polygraph tests. 263 Solomon argued that these cases rested on an analysis
of wrongful termination while he was asserting that "Mission had a duty
not to destroy his future employment prospects. '264
The court concluded that employees subject to DOT regulations can
protect themselves from harm vis-A-vis the collection and review proce-
dures in the regulations.26 5 Thus, the court had "less incentive to create a
duty requiring employers to exercise ordinary care" in collecting sam-
256. Id.
257. Id. at 708.
258. Id.
259. Mission Petroleum Carriers v. Solomen, 37 S.W.3d 482, 488 (Tex. App.-Beau-
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pies.2 6 6 The DOT regulations, the court held, "strike an appropriate bal-
ance between the need for efficient drug testing and the requirement that
each employee have the means to insist on the integrity of the
process. " 267
The court also assessed the impact Solomon's argument would have on
Texas' employment-at-will doctrine, particularly in light of the recent
Sears decision.268 Despite Solomon's attempt to distinguish Sears by ar-
guing that the urine collection process was not implemented to determine
an employee's employment status, the court stated that his complaint
concerned the process by which Mission chose to terminate him and thus
"goes to the core of at-will employment. '269 Solomon's argument, the
court admonished, would quickly swallow the employment-at-will rule.270
The court of appeals's reasoning was flawed because it "based its deci-
sion to impose a duty in part on the fact that Mission's negligently con-
ducted test caused Solomon damages beyond mere termination of his
employment. '271 This reasoning, the court stated, "failed to acknowledge
that any process used to discover employee misconduct or to evaluate
employee effort is, in effect, an 'investigation.' ' 272 Furthermore, the
court stated,
[b]ackground checks, coworker interviews, electronic surveillance,
finger or voice print analysis, expense-report audits, and perform-
ance reviews are all "investigations," conducted by employers, that
may result in job termination. It is not difficult to characterize an
erroneous performance report, which is often based on hearsay, as
the product of a negligent investigation .... If a duty of care were to
arise every time the harm to an employee transcends the employ-
ment agreement, the employment-at-will doctrine would be under-
mined because an employer's basis for termination would have to be
justified by a reasonable investigation, which is contrary to the
doctrine.273
Therefore, the court "declined Solomon's invitation to adopt a new
theory of liability for negligent drug testing."'274 Such a broad statement,
however, belies the court's attempt to narrow the holding to employers
undertaking drug testing pursuant to DOT regulations.
B. DEFAMATION
"Truth," as an affirmative defense to defamation, got a bit murkier dur-
ing the Survey period with the unpublished opinion in Cram Roofing Co.
266. Id. at 714.
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v. Parker.275 In November 1998, Cram Roofing hired Parker as the gen-
eral manager of its branch office in the Rio Grande Valley. Cram Roofing
also hired Joe Zamora as the production manager. In early July 1999,
Zamora abruptly quit. Given the circumstances of Zamora's resignation
and the subsequent disappearance of the work crew, as well as his inabil-
ity to immediately locate or contact Parker, Cram Roofing's president,
Gary Cram, assumed that Parker had also resigned and closed the Valley
office. According to Parker, however, he had not resigned; rather, Parker
said he was terminated by Cram when Cram closed the Valley office. 276
Shortly after Cram Roofing's Valley office was closed, Parker and
Zamora started a new business in direct competition with Cram Roofing.
In response, Cram Roofing's attorney wrote twelve identical letters to
various suppliers and roofing companies that Cram Roofing believed
would become Parker's prospective customers. The letter stated, among
other things, that "Cram Roofing will seek to recover all profits obtained
by your company as a result of Zamora and/or Parker's illegal activi-
ties. . .277 Shortly thereafter, Parker filed suit against Cram Roofing and
Gary Cram for libel based, in part, on the accusation that he had engaged
in "illegal activities." The jury found in favor of plaintiff.278
On appeal, Cram Roofing argued that its statement that Parker had
engaged in "illegal activities" was substantially true-in fact, the court
had determined that the non-competition agreement was valid and en-
forceable. 279 Thus, it believed it could rely on truth as an affirmative de-
fense. Although the appellate court began its analysis recognizing that
under the "substantial truth" test, the statement is examined in its en-
tirety to determine whether the "gist" of the statement is substantially
true.280 The court turned its attention away from such an elemental anal-
ysis, stating "[u]ltimately, the question here is whether Cram's statement
that Parker had engaged in 'illegal activities' is capable of defamatory
meaning, and if so, whether it is substantially true. ' 281 Because "illegal
activities" could, in the mind of an average person reading the statement,
be understood to mean that Parker was charged with a violation of some
criminal law, the court would not substitute its judgment for that of the
jury.2 82 The court did not evaluate the "substantial truth" of the state-
ment. The import of the court's opinion is that statements that convey
defamatory intent, even if true, may support a defamation claim.
The dissenting justice examined the definition of "illegal," which means
"contrary to or violating a law or rule or regulation or something else (as
275. Cram Roofing Co. v. Parker, No. 04-01-07-0723-CV, 2003 Tex. App. LEXIS 7523
(Tex. App.-San Antonio Aug. 29, 2003, no pet.) (not designated for publication).
276. Id. at *2.
277. Id. at *3-4.
278. Id. at *4-5.
279. Id. at *10.
280. Id. at *10-11.
281. Id. at *11.
282. Id. at *13-14.
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an established custom) having the force of law."'283 Thus, because a con-
tract has the force of law, the dissent found Cram Roofing's statement to
be substantially true as a matter of law.2 84
III. FAIR COMPETITION
During this Survey period, both federal and Texas courts continued to
shape the definition of "illusory promise" in the context of non-competi-
tion covenants. As evidenced by the notable cases from 2003, Texas em-
ployers should be wary of the enforceability of non-competition
covenants-especially as analyzed by Texas courts. In Guy Carpenter &
Co. v. Provenzale, the Fifth Circuit examined whether an illusory promise
to provide trade secrets will render a non-solicitation covenant unen-
forceable when an employment agreement contains other, non-illusory
promises. 285 In 1993, Anthony Provenzale signed a one-year employment
agreement with Sedgwick Payne Co. containing non-disclosure, non-com-
petition, and non-solicitation covenants.286 When Sedwick Payne Co.
merged with Guy Carpenter & Co. Inc. in 1999, Provenzale's employ-
ment agreement was amended. Although the new agreement added an
arbitration provision, reduced Provenzale's severance amount, and ad-
justed his compensation, the non-disclosure and non-solicitation cove-
nants of the original agreement were incorporated into the new
agreement.2 87
After Provenzale terminated his employment, Guy Carpenter asserted
misappropriation of trade secrets and breach of contract claims against
Provenzale, alleging that Provenzale solicited its clients and disclosed
confidential information to his new employer in violation of the 1999 em-
ployment agreement.2 88 The district court determined that both the non-
solicitation covenant and the non-disclosure covenants were unenforce-
able under the Texas statute governing the enforceability of contracts not
to compete and held that Guy Carpenter did not have a substantial likeli-
hood of success on its claims.2 89
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit first noted that the district court errone-
ously applied Section 15.50 of the Texas non-compete statute to the non-
disclosure covenant.2 90 Reasoning that trade and competition are af-
fected differently by non-disclosure covenants than by non-solicitation
covenants, the court emphasized that Section 15.50 does not apply to
non-disclosure covenants and only reviewed the non-solicitation covenant
283. Id. at *17 (Duncan, J., dissenting) (citing WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY 1126 (1981)).
284. Id.
285. Guy Carpenter & Co. v. Provenzale, 334 F.3d 459, 466-67 (5th Cir. 2003).
286. Id. at 462.
287. Id. at 462-63.
288. Id. at 463.
289. Id. at 464; see TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.50 (Vernon 2004).




The starting point for the court's analysis of non-solicitation covenant
was the landmark Texas Supreme Court case, Light v. Centel Cellular Co.
of Texas. 292 Under Light, the supreme court asks two questions in deter-
mining whether a covenant not to compete is enforceable. 293 First, the
court determines whether there is an otherwise enforceable agreement
involving non-illusory promises. 294 Second, the court examines whether
the covenant not to compete "is ancillary to or a part of an otherwise
enforceable agreement at the time the agreement is made. '295
The Fifth Circuit determined that both parties made non-illusory
promises as a part of the employment agreement, which satisfied the first
prong of the Light test. Guy Carpenter not only paid Provenzale $35,000
to execute the new employment agreement, it promised a severance pay-
ment to Provenzale if he was terminated without good cause prior to May
1, 2002. In exchange, Provenzale accepted a reduction in severance,
adopted the 1993 non-disclosure and non-solicitation covenants, and
agreed to mandatory arbitration.296
As for the "ancillary to or part of" element of the test, the court fol-
lowed the two-part inquiry established in Light, which asks whether: "(1)
the consideration given by the employer in the otherwise enforceable
agreement must give rise to the employer's interest in restraining the em-
ployee from competing; and (2) the covenant must be designed to enforce
the employee's consideration or return promise in the otherwise enforce-
able agreement. '297 The Fifth Circuit determined that the employee
agreement fell squarely within the Texas Supreme Court's definition be-
cause: (1) Guy Carpenter's promise to provide confidential information
created a genuine interest in restraining Provenzale from direct competi-
tion, and (2) the non-solicitation covenant was executed to enforce the
non-disclosure covenant. 298
Provenzale argued that Guy Carpenter's promise to provide trade
secrets was illusory because Guy Carpenter would have no obligation to
provide confidential information if Provenzale's employment was termi-
nated before the information was disseminated. 299 Notably, the Fifth Cir-
cuit disagreed with Provenzale's assertion that the promise to provide
confidential information must be non-illusory. The court reasoned that
such a construction would require employers to disclose confidential in-
formation at the time an employee signs an employment contract and
determined that "[t]his is not what Light, or [Section] 15.50, intends or
291. Id.
292. Light v. Centel Cellular Co. of Tex., 883 S.W.2d 642 (Tex. 1994).
293. Id. at 644.
294. An illusory promise is one that "fails to bind the promisor who always retains the
option of discontinuing employment in lieu of performance." Light, 883 S.W.2d at 645.
295. Provenzale, 334 F.3d at 465 (quoting TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.50).
296. Id.
297. Id. at 465 (citing Light, 883 S.W.2d at 647).
298. Id.
299. Id. at 466.
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requires. '300 Rather, the Fifth Circuit seems to hold that even if the
promise to provide confidential information is illusory, a non-competition
covenant can be enforceable if it is ancillary to or part of an otherwise
enforceable agreement. Here, Guy Carpenter promised severance in the
event of early termination and paid Provenzale $35,000 to execute the
1999 agreement. 301
Contrary to the Fifth Circuit's willingness to enforce non-competition
covenants, Texas courts continued to narrow the parameters of enforcea-
ble non-competition covenants during the Survey period. For example,
the Dallas Court of Appeals of Texas delivered a blow to Texas employ-
ers in Strickland v. Medtronic, Inc., when it reversed the trial court's order
granting a temporary injunction against Medtronic.30 2 In that case,
Strickland signed a one-year non-compete agreement with Medtronic.30 3
After Strickland terminated her employment with Medtronic and went to
work for one of its competitors, she filed suit seeking a declaratory judg-
ment that the non-compete agreement was unenforceable. The trial court
granted Medtronic an injunction prohibiting Strickland from contacting
area customers. She appealed the decision to the Dallas Court of
Appeals. 30 4
Although the court did not construe the language of the agreement to
obligate Medtronic to provide confidential information to Strickland, the
court pointed out that if there had been a promise to provide the infor-
mation, it would have been dependent on a period of at-will employment
and therefore illusory.305 Reasoning that Medtronic could have immedi-
ately fired Strickland and demanded she refrain from competing without
ever providing confidential information, the court concluded that the
agreement must be viewed at the time it is made to determine whether it
is illusory.30 6
Houston's Fourteenth Court of Appeals also addressed illusory
promises in Air America Jet Charter, Inc. v. Lawhon.30 7 In that case, Air
America Jet Charter agreed to give Scott Lawhon, a pilot, free training as
a Learjet captain and a raise of $750 per month in exchange for his agree-
ment to stay with the company for one year after obtaining his Learjet
certification. 308 Six months after obtaining his captain's rating, Lawhon
quit and Air American sued Lawhon for breach of contract and fraudu-
lent inducement. 30 9 The trial court granted Lawhon's motion for sum-
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. Strickland v. Medtronic, Inc., 97 S.W.3d 835, 837 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2003, pet.
dism'd).
303. Id.
304. Id. at 838.
305. Id. at 838-39.
306. Id. at 839.
307. Air America Jet Charter, Inc. v. Lawhon, 93 S.W.3d 441 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 2002, pet. denied).
308. Id. at 442.
309. Id. at 443.
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mary judgment and ordered that Air American take nothing. On appeal,
Lawhon asserted that the contract was unenforceable because it lacked
mutuality of obligation since it limited only his right to terminate, but not
Air America's right. The appeals court reversed the trial court and re-
manded the case for a new trial, rejecting Lawhon's argument. Instead,
the court concluded that the employment contract did not lack mutuality
of obligation, and that "[a] promise to provide specialized training is not
illusory. 310
In Tom James of Dallas, Inc. v. Cobb, the Dallas Court of Appeals
again addressed illusory promises. 311 Here, the court held that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that an agreement to pro-
vide sales aids, confidential information, and specialized training was an
illusory promise. 312 The court reasoned that the promises to provide
sales aids and confidential information could be construed as illusory be-
cause they were unenforceable at the time the agreement was made and
dependent on Lawhon's continued employment. Similarly, the court de-
termined that "at the moment the non-disclosure agreements were made,
the agreement to provide sales training was unenforceable because it was
based on past consideration. '31 3
Although the Fifth Circuit appears willing to enforce non-competition
covenants under some circumstances, Texas courts continue to limit the
application of Section 15.50 and Light.3 1 4 In light of the contrast between
federal and state courts, this Survey period did little to remedy the legiti-
mate confusion among Texas employers regarding how to protect their
business interests through the use of non-competition agreements.
IV. ARBITRATION
An arbitration agreement can provide a cost-effective and efficient
means to resolve employment-related disputes. The United States Su-
preme Court's opinion in Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle315 high-
lights the often-unanticipated issue of whether class action claims are
subject to arbitration.
The case involved commercial agreements between Green Tree, a
lender, and its customers that included an arbitration clause governed by
the Federal Arbitration Act. The agreement required the parties to sub-
mit to an arbitrator "[aill disputes, claims, or controversies arising from
or relating to this contract or relationships which result from the con-
tract. '316 A group of customers sued Green Tree claiming that it violated
state law. Green Tree, however, sought to compel arbitration under the
310. Id. at 444.
311. Tom James of Dallas, Inc. v. Cobb, 109 S.W.3d 877 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2003, no
pet.).
312. Id. at 887.
313. Id.
314. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.50; see also Light, 883 S.W.2d at 644.
315. Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 123 S. Ct. 2402, 2404 (2003).
316. Id. at 2405.
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terms of the agreement, which the court granted. In the arbitration set-
ting, Green Tree asked the arbitrator to consider only the claims of indi-
vidual customers, but the arbitrator found that a class action was more
appropriate. The class was ultimately awarded $20 million in penalties
and almost $7 million in attorneys fees. 317
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, Green Tree argued
that classwide arbitration was not allowed because the agreement con-
templated arbitration only between the company and individual custom-
ers. The Supreme Court, however, disagreed, stating that the agreement
did not expressly allow or forbid classwide arbitration. 318 Additionally,
the Court held that whether the agreement allowed classwide arbitration
was an issue that should be decided by the arbitrator. 319
In Wilcox v. Valero Refining Co., the District Court for the Southern
District of Texas considered the question of whether an employee can be
bound by arbitration policies implemented after an administrative charge
is filed. 320 Plaintiff alleged that he was denied promotional opportunities
during his tenure with the defendant solely because of his race and that
he was subjected to a racially hostile work environment. In response to
the defendant's perceived failure to take meaningful recourse to his com-
plaints, the plaintiff filed a Charge of Discrimination with the EEOC and
subsequently filed his lawsuit on December 10, 2002.321
On January 1, 2002, the defendant purchased Ultramar Diamond
Shamrock, Inc. ("UDS") and ultimately decided to adopt UDS's dispute
resolution program, Dialogue, to resolve all employment-related dis-
putes. This decision was announced to the employees in April 2002 by
mailing each employee a copy of the plan to their home address. The
defendant also posted fourteen posters containing information about Di-
alogue at its refinery, and posted the entire plan on the intranet. Further,
the defendant's Human Resources Manager had an informational meet-
ing with plaintiff on October 18, 2002 to discuss Dialogue. 322
The defendant argued that its actions in promulgating the dispute-reso-
lution plan and explaining it to plaintiff indicated that the plaintiff agreed
to Dialogue because he continued employment with the defendant past
June 1, 2002. In doing so, defendant argued, he agreed to "submit this
dispute to final and binding arbitration consistent with Dialogue. '323 The
court found, that even if he did otherwise agree to the plan by continuing
his employment, the plaintiff had essentially initiated his lawsuit before
Dialogue was implemented by filing a Charge of Discrimination with the
EEOC. This fact, the court held, rendered enforcement of the dispute-
317. Id.
318. Id. at 2405.
319. Id. at 2406.
320. Wilcox v. Valero Refining Co., 256 F. Supp. 2d 687, 690 (S.D. Tex. 2003).
321. Id. at 688-89.




resolution program "procedurally unconscionable. ' 32 4 In denying the de-
fendant's Motion to Abate and Compel Arbitration, the court explained
its reasoning as follows:
Plaintiff initiated the machinery of the justice system on May 28,
2002, before Defendant implemented its Plan. The Court refuses to
believe that a defendant can implement a dispute resolution pro-
gram, which contains binding arbitration, once a plaintiff has already
initiated a lawsuit against a defendant. If a defendant were allowed
to do such, a defendant could essentially change the rules in the mid-
dle of the game and prevent a plaintiff from having his day in
court .... Although technically his lawsuit was not filed in this Court
until December 10, 2002, after he received his Right to Sue letter, the
Court finds that it is disingenuous to conclude that he did not
"bring" his action until that date, for purposes of this analysis, be-
cause plaintiff was required to file a Charge of Discrimination with
the EEOC before he could file his lawsuit. Any other result does not
pass the smell test.32 5
The case of Brooks v. Pep Boys Automotive Supercenters clarified some
appellate procedural issues surrounding Motions to Compel Arbitra-
tion.326 In that case, a former employee brought a wrongful termination
lawsuit against his former employer. The court granted the defendant's
motion to compel arbitration and dismissed the case in its entirety. The
employee appealed, arguing that the court should have stayed the lawsuit
on compelling arbitration. 32 7
The appellate court agreed, holding that the "Civil Practice and Reme-
dies Code thus contemplates continuing trial-court jurisdiction over the
case pending arbitration, rather than the necessity of filing an additional
lawsuit concerning pending arbitration or postarbitration matters. ' 328 In
so concluding, however, the court acknowledged that the trial court's or-
der compelling arbitration was not "final," which robbed the appellate
court of its jurisdiction.329 Therefore, the appropriate means for obtaining
pre-arbitration appellate review is mandamus.330
324. Id. at 690.
325. Id. at 691.
326. Brooks v. Pep Boys Auto. Supercenters, 104 S.W.3d 656 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 2003, no pet.).
327. Id. at 658.
328. Id. at 660.
329. Id. at 660-61 (citing Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001)).
330. Id. at 661.
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